Not here. In 2013, the Senate overwhelmingly approved a similar bill, 64 to 32. See C. Whalen & B. Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 115–118 (1985). That seems implausible. Eskridge, Dishonorable Passions, at 103.But even if the words of Title VII did not definitively refute the Court’s interpretation, that would not justify the Court’s refusal to consider alternative interpretations. Seneca Falls was not Stonewall. ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAMELA S. KARLAN ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER IN 17-1618 AND THE RESPONDENTS IN 17-1623 MS. KARLAN: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When a employer fires a male employee Until now, federal law has always reflected that common usage and recognized that distinction between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination. Our duty is to understand what the terms of Title VII were understood to mean when enacted, and in doing so, we must take into account the societal norms of that time. But none of these contentions about what the employers think the law was meant to do, or should do, allow us to ignore the law as it is.4. Rather, they contend that even intentional discrimination against employees based on their homosexual or transgender status is not a basis for Title VII liability. . But no good judge would interpret the statute that way because the word “vehicle,” in its ordinary meaning, does not encompass baby strollers.That common usage in the States underscores that sexual orientation discrimination is commonly understood as a legal concept distinct from sex discrimination.Those cases exemplify a deeply rooted principle: When there is a divide between the literal meaning and the ordinary meaning, courts must follow the ordinary meaning.The Court’s argument rests on a false premise. After all, even back in 2007—a veritable lifetime ago in American attitudes about sexual orientation—the House voted 235 to 184 to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in employment. Since then, Title VII’s effects have unfolded with far-reaching consequences, some likely beyond what many in Congress or elsewhere expected.For those who regard congressional intent as the touchstone of statutory interpretation, the message of Title VII’s legislative history cannot be missed.The lessons these cases hold for ours are by now familiar.By contrast, this case involves sexual orientation discrimination, which has long and widely been understood as distinct from, and not a form of, sex discrimination. Any such notion would have clashed in spectacular fashion with the societal norms of the day.The political branches are well aware of this issue. We must determine the ordinary public meaning of Title VII’s command that it is “unlawful . So this is another example showing that discrimination because of sexual orientation does not inherently involve discrimination because of sex.Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1164 (5th ed. Rather, the employers submit that even intentional discrimination against employees based on their homosexuality or transgender status supplies no basis for liability under Title VII.The employers’ argument proceeds in two stages. But like the employers before us today, this employer would say not so fast. To end-run the bedrock separation-of-powers principle that courts may not unilaterally rewrite statutes, the plaintiffs here (and, recently, two Courts of Appeals) have advanced a novel and creative argument. If “sex” in Title VII means biologically male or female, then discrimination because of sex means discrimination because the person in question is biologically male or biologically female, not because that person is sexually attracted to members of the same sex or identifies as a member of a particular gender.Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2081 (2002):Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated their work would lead to this particular result. Along the way, we change his sexual orientation too (from homosexual to heterosexual). If only the Court would live by them.In Florida, the legislature enacted laws authorizing the revocation of teaching certificates for “misconduct involving moral turpitude,” Fla. Stat. In its certiorari petition, however, the company declined to seek review of that adverse decision, and no other religious liberty claim is now before us. 1(a)) (1969) (“The property or quality by which organisms are classified according to their reproductive functions”); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1307 (def. By discriminating against transgender persons, the employer unavoidably discriminates against persons with one sex identified at birth and another today. Each of the three cases before us started the same way: An employer fired a long-time employee shortly after the employee revealed that he or she is homosexual or transgender—and allegedly for no reason other than the employee’s homosexuality or transgender status.In short, an extensive body of federal law both reflects and reinforces the widespread understanding that sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from, and not a form of, sex discrimination.Although the Court does not want to think about the consequences of its decision, we will not be able to avoid those issues for long. Again, the individual employee’s sex plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge decision.No, it doesn’t.
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